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of harmony among the states, should the issue ever be tried before
the High Tribunal.
Economic considerations should be our premise in determining
whether or not a minimum wages and hours bill would qualify under
the harmony clause. We must show first that such a bill would operate to the welfare of the whole people and not to the benefit of any
class as opposed to the interests of another class. Secondly, that a
national ruling is necessary to avoid a disharmony that will result
from leaving the matter to local legislation.
Social research should account for the first requirement, as well
as for the second. To tie the legal technics in with economic and
social needs so as to justify a national solution to this problem is the
applied science of law, as creative in its usage 48as the inventor who
puts into practical effect the finding of theorists.
SYDNEY SAXON.

PRICE-FIxING AND THE FAIR TRADE ACTS.

Constitutionality of the FairTrade Acts.
The passage by 42 state legislatures of almost identical Fair
Trade Acts represents the culmination of almost thirty years of persistent striving by proponents of resale price maintenance to overcome
predatory price-cutting. It seemed, however, that all this work would
be of no avail in New York when the first resale price maintenance
contract was declared invalid by the Court of Appeals in Doubleday,
Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co.' In this case, the plaintiff publishing
company brought an action to restrain the defendant retailer (the
plaintiff publisher's vendee) from selling or offering for sale certain
books published by Doubleday, Doran & Company at a price less than
that stipulated as the retail price of such books in a contract made between such publisher and another retailer of books. Macy's defense
was that it had never had anything to do with this agreement made by
the plaintiff and the other retailer; that the stipulations as to the resale price of the books of the contracting retailer could not possibly
bind Macy & Co., a stranger to this contract; and that the Fair Trade

' The writer wishes to thank Arthur L. Shapiro, St. John's Law School,
'38, for much of the editorial comment contained herein.

1269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936).
Rav. 691; (1935)
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See Comment (1936) 34 MicH. L.
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1938]

NOTES AND COMMENT

statute 2 violated the due process clauses of the federal 3 and state 4
constitutions.
An analysis of this statute discloses that, in effect, it compels a
non-contracting retailer who has actual or constructive notice of the
resale price-maintenance agreement to adhere to the stipulated resale
price, which other parties have agreed upon, at the risk of a suit for
damages or a restraining injunction. Thus let us suppose that A, a
wholesaler of a trade-marked or specifically labeled product, contracts
with his immediate vendee B, a retailer, that the latter should not resell A's peculiarly identified product below a fixed price. As a result
C, another retailer who has notice of the resale price agreement made
between A and B, is bound to sell A's labeled goods at the price A
stipulated to B notwithstanding C himself was not in privity of contract with either A or B. The New York Court of Appeals upheld
the defendant Macy's contentions and ruled that the Fair Trade Act 6
is unconstitutional on the ground that the United States Supreme
2 Laws of 1935, c. 976, p. 1902. The New York Law provides as follows:
"Section 1. Subdivision 1. No contract relating to the sale or resale of a
commodity which bears, or the label or content of which bears, the trade mark,
brand, or name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which is in
fair and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced
by others shall be deemed in violation of any law of the state of New York by
reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in such
contract:
"(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price
stipulated by the vendor.
"(b) That the vendee or producer require on delivery to one whom he
may resell such commodity to agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at
the price stipulated by such vendor or by such vendee.
"2. Such provisions in any contract shall be deemed to contain or imply
conditions that such commodity may be resold without reference to such agreement in the following cases:
"(a) In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing
delivering any such commodity.
"(b) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and notice
is given to the public thereof.
"(c) By any officer acting under the orders of any court.
"Section 2. Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling
any commodity at less than the' price stipulated in any contract entered into
pursuant to the provision of section one of this act, whether the person so
advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract is
unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.
(Italics ours.)
"Section 3. This act shall not apply to any contract or agreement between
producers or between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale or resale price.
"Section 4. The following terms as used in this act, are hereby defined
as follows: 'Producer' means grower, baker, maker, manufacturer or publisher.
'Commodity' means any subject of commerce.
"Section 5. If any provision of this act is declared unconstitutional it is
the intent of the legislature that the remaining portions thereof shall not be
affected but that such remaining portions remain in full force and effect.
"Section 6. This act shall take effect immediately."
1U. S. CoNsT. Amdts. V, XIV.
' N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
Laws of 1935, c. 976, p. 1902.
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Court in numerous decisions 1 had decided that the state legislatures,
in the absence of an emergency, cannot fix the selling price of any and
all 7 commodities unless the business is "affected with a public interest"
and that these books are not so "affected." The plaintiff's answer,
that the Fair Trade Act was not price-fixing by the legislature; that
it was merely legislative consent or permission for parties to contract
as to resale price maintenance of trade-marked or branded articles; and
that it therefore bore no relation to the Supreme Court's refusal to
allow the state legislatures to fix the selling prices of diverse businesses, was disregarded by New York's highest court with the statement: 8
" * * to arbitrarily fix the price of books by legislation and not
by agreement comes within the condemnation of the decisions which
have heretofore dealt with like legislation. What the Legislature cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly. Nor does it cease to be a price
fixed by the Legislature because that body had clothed the publisher
with the power or authority to establish it. For a publisher to agree
with its subsidiary or agent to the price of a book which shall thereafter bind all other parties who purchased like books from the publisher is in reality a method whereby the Legislature fixes the price;
it is a species of delegated authority." (Italics ours.)
But this very argument of the plaintiff's was later adopted in
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp.9 by the
United States Supreme Court who refused to employ the New York
Court of Appeals' 10 viewpoint.
It is thus seen that the two high courts had two different interpretations of the Fair Trade Act: the New York Court of Appeals
finding that the Fair Trade Act is indirect legislative price-fixing and
the United States Supreme Court's holding that the statute is not a
method of legislative price-fixing but merely legislative consent for
parties to contract as to resale prices. The United States Supreme
Court's position, of course, must be regarded as the ruling law and
the New York Court of Appeals in Bourjois Sales Corp. v.
Dorfman I" expressly overruled its opinion in the Macy 12 case by
saying that it felt obliged to follow the decision of the nation's highest
court although distinctions in the facts could be drawn between the
8Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877) ; Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 391,
14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389,
34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914); Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 440, 47 Sup. Ct. 426
(1927) ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 548 (1928) ; Williams v.
Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (1929).
Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409
(1936).
'Id. at 281-282, 199 N. E. at 410.
'299 U. S. 183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
"'Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272. 199 N. E. 409
(1936).
"273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937).

'See

note 10, supra.
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Macy and the Seagram 13 cases. In the former case, it will be recalled, the defendant retailer never signed a resale price maintenance
agreement, while in the latter, Seagram distillers signed a price agreement but violated it. The New York Court of Appeals agreed, however, that under the Fair Trade Act these distinctions were a matter
of emphasis and not of principle.
To reason as New York's highest court did, that starting with
the premise (which the Supreme Court subsequently overruled 14)
that the Fair Trade Act was a price-fixing statute by indirection, it
would seem that the Court of Appeals decided as a matter of law 15
that these books, stamped with the publisher's name, are not "affected
with a public interest" and consequently their selling price can not be
fixed by the Legislature for the Supreme Court of the United States
had set up a standard'16 as to which businesses' prices could be regulated. A close examination of the Supreme Court's criterfon, so
assiduously followed by the Court of Appeals ' 7 of New York, reveals that this old standard itself lacked standardization and was virtually repudiated in 1934, two years before the Macy case was decided, in Nebbia v. New York '8 by the Supreme Court. The Court
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S.
183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
,Ibid.
(1935) 10 ST. JoHx's L. REv. 319.
See note 6, supra.
"'Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409
(1936).
"Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934) (That there
is nothing omnipotent and absolute about property rights and that business must
and can be regulated for the best interests of the public is settled. The state's
limitation in infringing on the due process clause is that the exercise of the
legislature's actions be neither arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, nor irrelevant to the desired ends. But the price-fixing action of the state legislatures
was overturned by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional from 1894 to 1934 for
the illusory reason that the "businesses were not affected with a public interest"
and not because the legislatures' action was arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, or irrelevant to the desired economic purposes. Not only did Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone in dissenting opinions decry this incomprehensible
and arbitrary test of price-fixing, but the majority of the bench and of the bar
did likewise. See Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE
L. J. 1089 (1930); Finklestein, Front Mum; v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton
(1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 769; Note (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 256; Hale, The Constitution and the Price System (1934) 34 COL. L. Rav. 401; Merrill, New
Judicial Approach to Price Fixing (1929) 18 Ky. L. J. 1; see dissenting opinions: of Mr. Justice Holmes in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 440. 47 Sup. Ct.
426 (1927); of Mr. Justice Stone in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48
Sup. Ct. 548 (1928); of Mr. Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932). Finally in 1934 the Supreme
Court with a changed personnel, in the Nebbia case overthrew the Supreme
Court's interpretation of "businesses affected with a public interest" as a guiding
principle for price fixing and this time the majority opinion written by Mr.
Justice Roberts, usinz all the arguments of the justices that were formerly in
the minority, said: "The phrase, affected with a public interest, can in the nature
of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject
to control for the public good." And in another place the majority opinion
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decided that a business' prices are subject to legislative control if it
is found (by the Court) that the general public is in danger of being
subjected to abusive prices. However, to reiterate, after the Seagram 19 case, the New York Court of Appeals reversed its earlier decision, followed the Supreme Court in Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfnan,2° and ruled that the Fair Trade Act was constitutional.
Background of the Fair Trade Statutes.
The first Fair Trade statute was enacted in California in 1931 21
and at this time new conditions, which had their origin in post-war
prosperity, were prevalent in business.2 2 Manufacturers and producers
of certain articles such as different kinds of soaps, powders, various
toilet articles, liquors, patent medicines, perfumes, and. canned, boxed
and bottled foodstuffs spent large sums of money to make their products well known by advertising through billboards, newspapers, magazines and the radio, and created a great demand for these articles and
their peculiar identifying marks, labels and names. The resulting
popularity and fame of these products was utilized as so-called "lossleader," "bait" and cut-rate schemes by certain large retailers, department and cut-rate stores as a means of enticing the general public
to do business with them and obtain unheard of "bargains." Many
stores sold some of these well-known goods not only at a lower price
than competitors, but at a price below cost in efforts to induce customers, who know the well-advertised articles' prices, to believe that
in these business places all articles were sold at cheaper prices than
in other stores. Soon the prestige and good-will of the label, trademark, brand or name of the manufacturer was damaged and he began
to try to induce his retailer-vendees to sell his branded article at a
standard price but, in general, his efforts at price-fixing were unsatisfactory.
A conference with his legal advisers probably informed him, if
he did not already know it, that the public policy of the courts since
read: "The due process clause makes no mention of sales or of prices any .more
than it speaks of business * * *.

The thought nevertheless seems to have per-

sisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may
charge * * 1 and that, however able to regulate other elements of manufacture

or trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly

controlling the price itself. This view was negatived many years ago").
"See
noteY.13,167,
supra.
2°273 N.
7 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937).
CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering 1931) § 8782, p. 4910, amended CAL. GEN.
LAWS (Deering 1933 Supp.) § 8782, p. 2396.
' SAYRE and KELLEY, MAINTENANCE OF RESALE PRcEs (1927) ; SELIGMAN
AND LovE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE, MAINTENANCE (1932) ; Grether, Experience in Californiawith Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting (1936)
24 CALIF. L. REv. 640; BURNS, DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936); U. S. FED.
TRADE COM., REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (Part I, 1929) (Part II,

1931);

CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

(1933).
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the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 23 in 1890 was free, open
and unrestricted competition for it was believed by the leading economists, the bench and the public in these "rugged individualistic"
days that such competition benefited the public in obtaining cheaper
prices.2 4 And as a result early attempts by manufacturers to maintain and standardize prices of goods made under secret process, trademarked, branded or labeled articles were struck down by the federal 2 5
and most of the state courts 2 6 as a violation of the Sherman 2 7 and
the later-passed Clayton Anti-Trust 28 and Federal Trade Commission 2 9 Acts. Legislative price-fixing was forbidden by the Supreme
Court from 1892 until 1934 unless the majority of the Justices thought
the "business was affected with a public interest." a0 In the interim,
the manufacturer's attempts at price-fixing by means of contracts, both
express and implied, 3 ' between manufacturers and retailers to standardize prices, various methods by which the manufacturers attempted
to sell their articles subject to a price restriction or condition,3 2 and
the employment of blacklists 3 (the listing of names of retailers who
28 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §1 (1934).
For a review of the state court decisions, see SELIGMAN AND LoVE, op.
cit. supra note 22, at Appendix III, pp. 460-470; 7_A. L. R. 449 (1920) ; Dunn,
Resale Price Maintenance (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 676; United States v. A.
Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U. S.85, 40 Sup. Ct 251 (1920); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377 (1927) ; Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139

(1936).

Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S.1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616 (1913) (This case was
held to be governed by the rule that a patentee who has parted with a patented
article by passing title to the purchaser has placed the article beyond the limits
of the monopoly secured by patent legislation. In Free American Graphaphone,
246 U. S. 8, 26, 38 Sup. Ct. 257 (1918), the Supreme Court struck down a
stipulation that patented articles should not be resold at prices other than those
fixed presently from time to time by the patent owner and suggested that if
this view resulted in damage to the patent holder's rights or if the law afforded
insufficient protection to the inventor, the remedy lay within the scope of the
legislature). (Italics ours.) Sewing Machine Co. v. Bry-Block Mercantile
Co., 204 Fed. 632 (W. D. Tenn. 1913); Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales
Co., 244 Fed. 156 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; see Note (1936-37) 12 Wis. L. REV. 226,
228, n.15.
" SELIGMANAND Lov, loc. cit. supra note 24.
=28 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
:38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1934).
-38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §41 (1934).
coSee note 6, supra.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373,
31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911) ; Boston Store of Chicago v. Am. Graphaphone Co., 246
U. S.8, 38 Sup. Ct. 257 (1918) ; United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252
U. S.85, 40 Sup. Ct. 251 (1920).
'Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sul. Ct. 616 (1913); Straus v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S.490, 37 Sup. Ct. 412 (1917).
'Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S.441, 42 Sup. Ct.

150 (1922).
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refused to follow the producer's
price suggestions) were all condemned
4
by the Supreme Court as:3
"illegal restraints of trade * * *

It creates, in effect, a com-

bination for prohibited purposes. The producer having sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever
advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic."
The Court also indicated that the manufacturer who sold his
product at a price satisfactory to himself parted with his whole title,
and therefore was in no position to dictate to his vendee, the sole and
absolute owner of the article, as to resale price.3 5 But it should be
noted, as Mr. Justice Sutherland emphasized in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp.,36 that while the Supreme
Court once held that: 3
"a system of contracts between manufacturers, wholesalers, and
retail merchants which sought to control the prices of sales by all
such dealers by fixing the amount which the consumer should pay,
amounted to an unlawful restraint of trade, invalid at common law,
and so far as interstate commerce was affected, invalid under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act * * *," there was a strong implication that

there was no constitutionalobjection to these contracts for in the same
opinion the Supreme Court said: 38 "Nor can the manufacturer by
rule of notice, in the absence of contract or statutory right (Court's
italics) even though its restriction be known to purchasers, fix prices
for future sales." And the Seagram3 9 opinion points out that this
old view of the Supreme Court in condemning price maintenance
schemes was based on the fact that they constituted an unlawful restraint of trade and that 40 "a careful reading of the decisions discloses
no other ground." (Italics ours.)
Thus we notice that at the same time the Supreme Court was
forbidding direct legislative price-fixing as unconstitutional, 41 it was
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373,
407-409, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911).
"Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616 (1913) ; Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139
(1936) (Generally, the right of an owner of property to fix the price at which
he will sell the property is an inherent attribute of this property and is protected by the due process clauses of the United States Constitution. The
Supreme Court in this case held that the Fair Trade Act makes no exception
of the subject matter (trade-marked or labeled goods) of resale price maintenance legislation for the manufacturer or producer of the "identified" product
is entitled to have his "good-will", the well-known trade-mark or label, protected).
26299 U. S.183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 408 Sup. Ct.
376, 386 (1911).
Id. at 405, 31 Sup. Ct. at 383.
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S.
183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
" Id. at 184, 57 Sup. Ct. at 384.

" See note 6, snpra.
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implying 42 that legislative permission or consent would permit certain
price-maintenance agreements to be made and that these contracts had
no constitutional objections. The Seagram opinion mentions that
from time to time efforts, which bore no fruit until August, 1937,
were made to have Congress authorize standardization of price agreements in respect to identified (by means of trade-marks, labels or
names) goods and that while the proposed legislation was assailed
vigorously in other respects by the bar, public and economic experts,
there were no constitutional infirmities suggested. 43 But in spite of
the inferences that certain contracts as to resale prices were constitutional, the manufacturer's hands were still tied and it seemed as
though he were powerless to prevent the predatory price-cutting, for
price-maintenance agreements had formerly been denounced by the
Supreme Court as illegal restraints of trade. 44 It took a long time,
but finally the manufacturer and his legal aides realized that the Supreme Court's subtle suggestion was that only the legislature could
aid resale price maintenance in each individual state for the Federal
Anti-Trust legislation of 1890 45 and 1914 46 represented the attitude
of Congress. Once again fortune smiled on the manufacturer who formerly had successfully resisted legislative price-fixing by pleading the
due process clauses, for public and economic opinion had changed and
the general majority beliefs in 1931 were that predatory price-cutting
was destroying the good-will of the producer's trade-mark, name or
label; that the principle that free and open competition was beneficial
and desirous did not apply to the cut-rate situation; that the public
was being misled and ultimately injured by the "loss leader," "bait,"
and "bargain" schemes of the cut-rate retailers; and that innumerable
small retailers, who could not compete with these unholy tricks, were
being driven out of business with a consequent loss of markets for the
42 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183,
57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
'3 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers, 299 U. S. 183,
57 Sup. Ct. 139, 143 (1936) ("It is not without significance that while the

proposed legislation was vigorously assailed in other respects, we do not find
that any constitutional objection was urged. And the decisions of this court,
far from suggesting any constitutional infirmity in such proposed legislation,
contain implications to the contrary * * *. While these observations of the
court cannot, of course, be regarded as decisive of the question, they plainly
imply that the court at the time foresaw no valid constitutional objection to
such legislation, for it cannot be supposed that the court would suggest a legislative remedy the validity of which might seem open to doubt"). For Congressional hearing see: Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on H. R. 13305, 63d Cong.,
2d and 3d Sess. (1914) ; H. R. 13568. 64th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1916-17) ;
REP. FED. TRADE CoMiAi.

H. Doc.
"See
4228
"38
U. S. C.

ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, 70th Cong., 2d Sess.,

No. 546 (1929).
note 31, supra.
STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1934) ; 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15
§ 41 (1934).
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manufacturer. 47 Ironically, the manufacturer who had bitterly fought
state legislative attempts to regulate his business' prices now reversed
his attitude and appealed to his former adversary to help him fix prices
in other people's businesses. And the ever-merciful legislature did so
by conceiving the Fair Trade Act.
In 1931 the California State Legislature enacted the first Fair
Trade statute 48 and by August, 1937, forty-two states had passed
fundamentally the same Act. 49 Prior to this, Congress had refused to
abandon its old economic concept that resale price-maintenance agreements were economically unsound with the result that such contracts
were illegal under the Federal Anti-Trust Statutes 50 and it was therefore necessary for each individual state to legalize resale price maintenance within its own territory and jurisdiction. Nevertheless, if
the manufacturer or producer of identified goods engaged in interstate
commerce, he was still violating the federal laws and therefore efforts
were continued to have Congress exempt from the Federal Anti-Trust
Laws agreements for resale price maintenance which are lawful under
state Fair Trade Acts. Congress finally yielded to public opinion and
passed the Tydings-Miller Act-an amendment 51 to the Sherman Act
" SAYRE AND KELLEY, MAINTENANCE OF RESALE PRICES (1927) ; SELIGMAN
AND LOVE, PRICE CUrING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE (1932) ; Grether, Experi-

ence in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting
(1936) 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640; BURNS, DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936); U. S.
FED. TRADE COM., REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (Part I, 1929)
(Part II, 1931); CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

(1933) ; Miller, The Maintenance of Uniform Resale Prices (1914)

63 U.

OF

PA. L. REv. 22; Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade (1913)
27 HARV. L. REv. 139; Note (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 267; Miller, The
Fair Trade Act (1936) 5 FORD. L. Rzv. 50; Comment (1936) 31 ILL. L. Rzv.

793.

" CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering 1931) § 8782, p. 4910, amended, CAL. GEN.
LAWS (Deering 1933 Supp.) § 8782, p. 2396. The amendment reads as follows:
"Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant
to the provisions of § 1 of this act, whether the person so advertising, offering
for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition
and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby."
As amended it was adopted by the forty-one other states.

The Wisconsin

Fair Trade Act, Wis. Laws of 1935, c. 52, p. 80, has a provision for an administrative tribunal to review prices at the protest of anyone who believes them to
be unfair or unreasonable.
" It should be noticed that in 1913 New Jersey enacted a statute which made
it unlawful for any merchant to cut prices on a trade-marked product where the
goods carried a notice prohibiting such practice (N. J. Laws of 1916, c. 106).
This was the only form of legislation that sanctioned resale price maintenance
until 1931. New Jersey, twenty-two years later, passed a similar statute to the
California and New York Fair Trade Acts (N. J. Laws of 1935, c. 58, §§ 1-6).
' 28 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1934); 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15
U. S. C. § 13 (1934); 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §41 (1934).

'The text of (H. R. 7472 passed the Senate, was signed by President
Roosevelt, and became law in August, 1937) the federal price maintenance
measure which amends Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 28 STAT. 209 (1890),
15 U. S. C. § 1 (1894), reads as follows:
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exempting the state Fair Trade Acts from Federal Anti-Trust Laws
-and today those persons desiring to enter into resale price agreements in the states which have Fair Trade Acts can now do so without fear of prosecution under federal law.
In December, 1936, the constitutionality of the Illinois 52 Fair
Trade statute, with similar provisions to the California and New York
price-maintenance statutes, was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Old Dearbor-nDistributingCompany v. Seagram Distillers Corp.53 Mr. justice Sutherland rejected the argument that the
Fair Trade Acts were indirect legislative price-fixing and that therefore price-fixing in the distilling business was prohibited as violative
of the due process clauses because this business was not "affected with
a public interest" and ruled: that prices in respect of identified (by
trade-mark, name or label) goods may be fixed under legislative leave
or permission by contract between the parties; that the resale pricemaintenance statutes' essential aim is to protect the good-will of the
manufacturer's identified product, a valuable property right entitled to
protection; and that retailers can sell the product at any price by
stripping off the manufacturer's peculiar identifying mark; that the
retailer against whom the statute is aimed is not an innocent purchaser of the identified product, but one who acquired the goods with
a pre-existing knowledge of the price-maintenance contract made by
the manufacturer with another retailer; that if the retailer elects to
buy the identified product with the pre-conditioned price restriction,
he should not complain of the price standardization for he was not
compelled to buy the goods; and that the Supreme Court accepts the
economic opinion of the legislature.
Several months after the Seagram decision, the New York Court
of Appeals in Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman 54 expressly overruled
its earlier attitude as stated in the Macy 55 case, followed the United
States Supreme Court, and ruled that the Fair Trade Act was constitutional in New York State. It would seem, albeit the Supreme
Court says that the Fair Trade statutes are not legislative price-fixing
but merely legislative permission for certain parties to contract as to
resale price maintenance, that the forces that have been endeavoring to
"Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or
with foreign nations is hereby declared illegal: Provided, that nothing herein
shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the
resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container which bears, the
trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity
and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that
description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions * * *." (Italics
ours.)
Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. of 1935, c. 1212, § 188 et seq.
299 U. S.183, 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936).
r,273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937).
'Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409
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obtain judicial consent to fix prices have at last achieved their objective. It has been indicated that all that a manufacturer or producer
has to do to compel retailers to sell his goods at a certain price is to
label or trade-mark his products. This is undoubtedly one form of
price regulation, but if one follows the Supreme Court and refuses to
call the Fair Trade scheme legislative price-fixing by indirection as
the New York Court of Appeals did in the Macy case, it can be called
price-fixing by means of a specific legislative sanctioned contract.
However, it would seem that even if the United States Supreme Court
had agreed with the New York Court of Appeals and ruled that the
resale price-maintenance statutes were legislative price-fixing, the nation's highest court would have sustained the constitutionality of the
Fair Trade Acts on the basis of its former decision in the Nebbia 56
case (i.e., the danger of abusive prices to the public). It is to be noted
that a fundamental difference underlies the two different interpretations. If a court rules that a statute is constitutional legislative pricefixing, it (the court) constitutes itself the sole determiner whether the
enacted law will benefit the general public. If, however, a statute is
ruled to be a constitutional legislative sanction for contractual pricefixing, the court accepts the economic opinion of the legislature. In
the former case, the court assumes an omnipotent and omniscient
role, while in the latter instance, it altruistically allows the legislature
to enact its economic concepts.
A close analysis of the Fair Trade Acts provokes much astonishment and conjecture as to how the Supreme Court arrived at its conclusion that this is price-fixing by contract. 57 Under the statutes, the
manufacturer has merely to find one person, possibly an agent, to
contract with and all the other retailers who have been notified of
the stipulated price by some mysterious source, or by the manufacturer openly, will be bound notwithstanding they themselves never
made any agreement with the producer. And an empty right is given
to these non-contracting parties who wish to sell at their prices in
the form of a suicidal election not to buy the very popular and much
demanded identified product. However, whether the Fair Trade Acts
'Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934) ; see note
18, supra.
' See note 55, supra. See also Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp.,
N. Y. L. J., Jan. 15, 1938, p. 233, col. 1 (The statute is not unconstitutional
notwithstanding the defendant retailer never signed a price maintenance contract
for an injunction or damages may only be obtained by a plaintiff if the defendant
violator had knowledge of the existence of a resale price agreement. In this
case, the proof shows that a letter was received advising it of the existence of
fair trade contracts and enclosing a form of such contracts).
It should also be noted that Section 3 of the New York Fair Trade Act (and
all the other states have the identical provision) reads that "this act shall not
apply to any contract or agreement between producers or between wholesalers or
between retailers as to sale or resale price." These, commonly denominated
"horizontal agreements" (i.e. between wholesaler and wholesaler or between
retailer and retailer) in distinction to "vertical" agreement (i.e. between wholesalers and retailers), are illegal under the Anti-Trust statutes.
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be denominated legislative price-fixing or legislative sanction for pricefixing, it is this writer's opinion that the Supreme Court's decision
was a sound and desirable one in view of the aforementioned abusive
results of predatory price-cutting. But in a true democracy dissenting
voices will always be heard and immediately after the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Trade Acts
by accepting the economic opinion of the Legislature that resale price
maintenance is essential for the public welfare, opponents of this form
of price control began to predict that the Fair Trade statutes would
eventually produce greater social evils than those caused by predatory
price-cutting, the immediate reason for the procreation of the Fair
Trade legislation.
Several months before the Seagram case, Judge Rosenman, in
Coty, Inc. v. Hearn Dept. Store,58 denounced the Fair Trade Act as
arbitrary, unconstitutional price-fixing and outlined many weaknesses
of this form of legislation. His and other 59 criticisms were: that the
prices are fixed, not by a state body, but by private individuals at any
level they desire; that no outsider, who may be ultimately bound by
the determination, is permitted an opportunity to be heard as to the
reasonableness of the prices; that the consumer, who must bear the
burden of the increased prices, has no opportunity to state his views;
that no machinery is provided for judicial or administrative review
of any of the acts of the price-fixers; that there is no standard set up
for the contract to be entered into between producer and retailer, by
virtue of which contract the conduct of all retailers is to be governed;
that discrimination may be made in favor of certain retailers; that
no standard is set up which is adjustable to particular conditions in
given localities; that no standard is set up to guide non-contracting
retailers as to which contract they are bound by for the statute says
any contract; that the consequent higher prices would encourage bootlegging; and that the cost of living would be raised.
Recent Treatment of the New York FairTrade Act.
It should be noticed, however, that this disparaging viewpoint of
the price-fixing situation under the seemingly unadministratable Fair
Trade Acts was an a priori one since it was based on purely theoretical arguments and was made before the results of the statute's
application to business could be clearly seen. But as the end of 1937
approached, it began to appear that the complaint that discrimination
could easily be practiced by the producer of branded or trade-marked
articles in favor of some retailers was justified.6 0 It is undoubtedly
158 Misc. 267, 284 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1936).
N. Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1937, p. 1, col. 1.
Nat. Distillers Products Corp. v. Columbus Circle Liquor Stores, N. Y.
L. J., Jan. 18, 1938, p. 272, col. 1; Schimpf v. Macy & Co., N. Y. L. J., Jan.
20, 1938, p. 312, col. 1.

316^

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

within the power and discretion of the producer of identified products
to sue one violator of a resale price contract and yet ignore another's
breach. And the Fair Trade statutes provide for no penalty for pricecutting aside from a suit for damages or a restraining injunction. But
just as the excitement among retailers began to 'spread alarmingly and
agitation for an amendment to the New York Fair Trade Act grew,
the Appellate Division of the Second Department in Port Chester
Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros.6 1 ruled that one retailer may sue
for damages or restrain another retailer from price-cutting though
the parties are not in privity of contract on the ground that Section 2
of the New York resale price-maintenance statute reads that "any"
person damaged may sue. And the court pointed out that this is
proper justice for the retailer who observes contract obligations, bears
the brunt of price-cutting by his retail competitor and has a limited
property right in the producer's good-will.
In view of the treatment and interpretation that the Fair Trade
statute has received in the Port Chester case and in other lower court
decisions, 62 it is submitted that a hopeless and disparaging attitude
towards the resale price-maintenance situation in New York is unwarranted.
In Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 3 an
injunction was obtained restraining the defendant retailer from selling plaintiff's branded products at prices below those fixed by existing
price-maintenance contracts though defendant had never signed such
an agreement. Mr. Justice Shientag in a carefully worded opinion
sums up recent decisions and points out that: the legislature, instead
of formulating certain general rules and leaving them to some administrative agency to apply under varying conditions, has laid down
broad general principles and put the burden of interpretation directly
on the courts at the instance of private litigants; that the obvious legis253 App. Div. 188, 1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 802 (2d Dept. 1938).
Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 15, 1938, p.
233, col. 1; Schimpf (Croker-Evans Service) v. Macy & Co., N. Y. L. J.,
Jan. 20, 1938, p. 312, col. 1; Nat. Distillers Products Corp. v. Opera Wine &
Liquor Corp., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 29, 1938, p. 488, col. 5 (Injunction not granted
in this case for plaintiff did not show that the equities were in his favor). It
will be seen from a study of lower court decisions during the last couple of
months that the courts feel that the New York legislature purposely did not
provide for any administrative body or agency to review prices at the protest
of anyone who finds them unreasonable as did the lawmakers of Wisconsin
(Wis. Laws of 1935, c. 52, p. 80) but intended to let the courts decide resale
price maintenance disputes according to the equities of each specific case. If
for example, the defendant's breach was not deliberate and it (a corporation)
specifically pleads in its brief an intention to abide by the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff's motion for an injunction (Nat. Distillers Products Corp. v.
Brandie-Wine Stores, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 4, 1938, p. 601, col. 1) will not be
granted. In the Seyopp case, cited in the instant footnote, an injunction
pendent lite was not granted because the complaint did not allege that the goods
which were sold in violation of the statute were acquired by the defendant
subsequent to its acquiring knowledge of the resale price agreements.
' N. Y. L. J., Jan. 20, 1938, p. 312, col. 7.
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lative intent is that the Fair Trade statute should receive a broad judicial construction in order to effectuate its primary purpose and to
eliminate and minimize any hardship or inequity which may result
from its application; that not only should the brand owner be protected
but the retailer and consuming public as well; and that equitable principles and safeguards should be applied to prevent the producer from
treating the retailer arbitrarily. The learned justice then goes on to
formulate certain rules which the courts should apply in settling disputes between Fair Trade litigants. Among his praiseworthy and
outstanding suggestions he indicates that the statute implicitly requires that the prices fixed for resale by retailers be uniform in any
one competitive area; that, between the parties, discounts and trade-in
allowances are not precluded if made fairly; that manufacturer or
producer should diligently seek to prevent price-cutting by means of
legal process or by refusing to sell to violators of the statute; and
he concludes that experience may show the need of creation of an
administrative agency charged with the enforcement of the resale
price-maintenance statute. It is to be noted that the Wisconsin Fair
Trade Act 64 provides for such an administrative agency, but during
the three years of the existence of this price review tribunal no appeal
has been made by anyone affected by any price-maintenance contract
and all the other Fair Trade states have had no opportunity to observe the results and achievements of such a body.
Conclusions.
Thus, to reiterate, it is submitted that the legislators were not
entirely unmindful of the general public's ultimate veto power in the
form of a boycott on exorbitant-priced branded products and because
of this highly potent economic weapon, the power of retailers to check
on each other by means of a suit for damages or a restraining injunction, and because of the application of equitable principles as a condition precedent to granting relief to Fair Trade litigants by the courts,
many of the fears regarding the workableness of the resale pricemaintenance acts may soon prove to be unjustified and groundless.
M.

RICHAm WYNNE.

THE MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY.

Introductory.
The common law courts chained the hands of liberal judges with
iron bonds of intricate rules of procedure.1 Adjective law became the
"Wis. Laws of 1935, c. 52.
'The system of common law pleading developed after the Norman Conquest, and was first methodically formed into a science during the reign of

